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Abstract
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Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4749
Australia introduced a mandatory retirement savings 
scheme in 1992. This built on pre-existing voluntary 
occupational plans. The new scheme has been very 
successful in expanding coverage and mobilizing large 
financial savings that are equal to close to 100 percent 
of GDP. However, Australia does not impose restrictions 
on payout options. The payout phase used to be 
dominated by lump sum withdrawals, which accounted 
for 80 percent of benefit payments as recently as 2002. 
But pension payments increased in recent years and 
now represent 45 percent of total payments. The vast 
majority of these pension payments take the form of term 
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part of a larger effort in the department to understand and inform country policy debate with respect to the retirement 
income systems design and performance. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.
worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at cthorburn@worldbank.org.  
annuities and allocated annuities. The latter are similar to 
phased withdrawals in Chile but run for fixed terms of up 
to 25 years rather than for lifetime terms. The demand 
for life annuities and lifetime phased withdrawals is 
very limited. The paper discusses the factors that have 
shaped the pattern of demand for retirement products, 
including the availability of the universal age pension and 
the effect of clawback provisions, the impact of the high 
level of home ownership, and the widespread preference 
of retiring workers for reliance on self-annuitization. 
The paper also reviews the prudential regulation of 
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This paper on the market for retirement products in Australia is part of a broader project 
on life annuities and retirement products, coordinated by Roberto Rocha, program 
manager in the unit for Financial Markets for the Social Safety Net, of the Financial and 
Private Sector Development Vice-Presidency of the World Bank.  The project was 
initiated in 2004 to fill an apparent gap in the pension literature, especially in the 
literature addressing the payout phase of defined contribution pension systems.  Many 
countries that have implemented systemic pension reforms and introduced private 
pension systems are now facing the challenge of organizing the payout phase for retiring 
workers.  Organizing the payout phase entails introducing a well-regulated market for 
retirement products, covering the effective regulation and supervision of retirement 
products, marketing activities, providers and intermediaries.  However, the literature on 
the payout phase is generally focused on a few countries and topics, and does not address 
in sufficient detail the institutional and regulatory issues faced by policy-makers in 
reforming countries.  
 
The World Bank project fills the gap by reviewing in detail a number of representative 
country cases, including Australia, Chile, Denmark, Sweden, and Switzerland.  These 
countries have large mandatory or quasi-mandatory private pension systems operating 
primarily on a defined contribution basis and have already entered the payout phase.  
Moreover, their institutional and regulatory arrangements for the payout phase are 
different in many aspects, including decentralized and centralized arrangements for the 
provision of life and term annuities, different menus of retirement products, different 
approaches to price regulation and risk-sharing, different marketing rules, and different 
capital rules for providers.  Therefore these countries provide a rich variety of 
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1  Introduction 
This paper considers the structure of the Australian retirement income arrangements, and 
looks at motivations which have led to government policies towards retirement income 
and its impact on the popularity, or otherwise, of differing retirement income products.  
In the context of the development of global annuity markets, it seeks to show why the 
market for annuities in Australia is so poorly developed, and how recent policy changes 
are likely to make annuities even less attractive. The Australian experience with annuities 
is best approached by first examining the contextual arrangements as these have a strong 
direct influence on actual practice. These contextual arrangements include: a long-
standing and relatively generous first pillar with wide but means tested access; formalized 
second pillar arrangements with a strong defined contribution orientation; and taxation 
and social security arrangements that influence consumer and market participant 
behavior. 
The role of the mandatory second tier pension framework has been motivated by a desire 
to ensure that Australians have a better income in retirement than they could expect from 
the government-provided age pension.  The system is also designed to boost national 
saving and reduce the rate of growth of government pension outlays. The system provides 
retirees with great flexibility and personal choice regarding how they invest the assets 
they have accumulated for their retirement. Despite this, there is considerable confidence 
that these assets will be used wisely. The government provides a range of incentives to 
encourage retirees to take up income stream products; however, it relies to a much greater 
extent on common sense and prudent management by individuals rather than any form of 
compulsion to ensure that accumulated assets are used primarily by individuals to support 
themselves in their retirement.  The government still expects to play an important role in 
the provision of a publicly funded age pension well into the future. 
The provision of second pillar private income is left to the private sector.  It is supported 
by a comprehensive regulatory framework based on a formal risk-based model which not 
only provides the regulator with a risk rating for pension providers and life insurance 
companies, but also a matrix of supervisory response.  Pension and annuity providers 
who provide guaranteed income streams are subject to capital requirements to ensure that 
their commitments can be honored. 
2  The Australian Pension System 
2.1  Public Pensions 
For a considerable period of time, the Australian retirement incomes system consisted of 
a first pillar age pension. The age pension was established in 1908, providing a flat rate 
pension through the federal government on a pay-as-you-go basis. The majority of 
Australians looked to the age pension as their main source of retirement income. The 
pension was subject, for a long period, to an income and asset based ‘means test’ but, 
progressively into the 1970s the means testing was made more liberal until it focused on 
income only and not on assets. In response to the fact that it was possible for many older 
Australians to arrange their financial affairs such that they had considerable assets but 
generated limited income for ‘means testing’ purposes, an asset based test was 
  5reintroduced in 1985.  Currently both an assets and income test apply.  The rate of 
pension payment is calculated under both tests and the test that results in the lower rate 
(or nil rate) will apply. 
The government enacted laws in 1997 to set the level of the age pension at 25 percent of 
an average wage measure so the pension is now indexed to wages as a matter of course. 
Rates are indexed twice a year in March and September, to the greater of CPI or Male 
Total Average Weekly Earnings (MTAWE). The single rate is benchmarked to 25 
percent of MTAWE and the combined rate is set so that the single rate is 60 percent of 
the combined rate. Thus, the combined rate amounts to 41.7 percent of the average wage. 
The pension is assessable for income tax purposes. 
The income test operates so as to permit a full pension for those with limited income and 
reduce that pension by an amount of 40 cents for each dollar earned over and above the 
thresholds (refer Table 1). A single pensioner can retain the full pension and currently 
earn an additional $128 per fortnight. As the pensioner’s income increases the pension 
reduces by 40 cents for each additional dollar of other income but total income would 
increase. At the point where income reaches $1,445 per fortnight then the pension 
entitlement ceases. The threshold income for the clawback provision amounts to just over 
6 percent of the average wage, while the age pension is eliminated when income reaches 
69 percent of the average wage. The two threshold levels are higher for couples. The first 
corresponds to 11 percent of the average wage and the second to 115 percent. (Details of 
current test parameters are available on the Centrelink website.) 
Table 1: Income Test Details (current as at March 2007) 
Family situation  For full payment (per 
fortnight)* 
For part payment (per 
fortnight) up to+#  
Universal pension (single rate)  $527 or 25% of AW   
Universal pension (combined rate)  $878 or 41.7% of AW   
Average wage (AW)  $2108   
Single rate  up to $128 or 6.1% of AW  $1,445.25 or 68.6% of AW 
Combined rate (couples)  up to $228 or 10.8% of AW  $2,435.00 or 114.9% of AW 
* Income over these amounts reduces the rate of pension payable by 40 cents in the dollar (single), 20 cents 
in the dollar each (for couples). 
Source: FaCSIA 
The treatment of the income arising from various investments, including income stream 
products, has been an important influence on how Australians of pensionable age arrange 
their financial affairs. By making a particular product more or less favorably treated 
relative to other products, it is to be expected that the demand for such products will 
change. For example, at one point it was relatively attractive for pensioners to retain 
investments in low interest bearing accounts so as to maintain their access to pension 
benefits. This has been addressed by a combination of factors, including assessing some 
investments based on a ‘deemed’ income level rather than the actual level.  This also 
seeks to prevent the perverse behavior of seeking lower returns on assets simply to 
receive a higher age pension, and encourages pensioners to invest at market-rates of 
interest. 
The asset test applies against asset holdings instead of income receipts. People with 
substantial assets are expected to rearrange their affairs to provide for themselves in 
retirement (Centrelink 2007). This test reduces the pension according to separate 
  6schedules for home owners and for other pensioners reflecting the benefit that a person 
gains from owning rather than renting (Table 2).  
Table 2: Asset Test Details (current as at March 2007) 
Family situation  For full payment*  For part payment  From September 2007 
Homeowners      
Average annual wage  $54,808  $54,808   
Single rate  $161,500 or 2.95 AAW  $338,500 or 6.18 AAW  $520,750 or 9.50 AAW 
Combined rate (couples)  $229,000 or 4.18 AAW  $523,500 or 9.55 AAW  $825,500 or 15.06 AAW 
Non-Homeowners     
Single rate  $278,500 or 5.08 AAW  $455,250 or 8.31 AAW  $641,750 or 11.71 AAW 
Combined rate (couples)  $346,000 or 6.31 AAW  640,500 or 11.69 AAW  $946,500 or 17.27 AAW 
* Prior to 20 September assets over these amounts reduced the rate of pension payable by $3.00 per 
fortnight for each $1000. From 20 September 2007 assets exceeding the thresholds reduce the pension by 
$1.50 per fortnight. 
Source: FaCSIA 
The halving of the clawback provision in the asset test has made it less onerous and will 
reduce the impact of the accumulated balances under the superannuation guarantee 
scheme since the upper threshold for the combined rate for home-owners has been raised 
from 10 times average annual earnings to 15 times. A person on average earnings who 
contributes for 40 years and experiences a 2 percent annual wage growth would require 
an average investment return of 8.5 percent to reach the new higher level compared to 6.5 
percent before the change in the rules. The new less onerous asset test is also likely to 
reinforce the aversion to the purchase of life annuities, since the impact of the income test 
has not been weakened. 
Assets are defined for assessable purposes in a way that also influences pensioner 
behavior. The Social Security Act also exempts the value of certain ‘life interests’, burial 
plots paid for in advance, and certain “assets test exempt income streams”. 
The pensioner’s principal home is an exempt asset no matter what its value. This is 
largely as a result of the strong attachment to home ownership and the associated 
financial security it involves in the Australian culture. As a result, however, it is possible 
to accumulate substantial wealth in a principal residence and avoid any impact on social 
security entitlements arising from this wealth.  
Australia exhibits a high level of home ownership and, as a result, the influence of the 
treatment of the principal private residence is particularly important in retirement plans 
and is politically material in considering policy options.  In 2001, overall home 
ownership was 70 percent (Table 3), a relatively high rate by global standards. 
  7Table 3: Home Ownership Rates in Selected Countries 
 
Source: ABS Australian Social Trends 2001, Cat. No. 4102.0: 
Furthermore, as shown in Figure 1, for those reaching retirement age home ownership 
levels are above 80 percent.  This reflects, in part, the use by retiring Australians of their 
retirement savings to pay off their outstanding home loans. 
Although the home has been viewed as a source of support in retirement, until recently 
this has mainly been accessible through the sale of the property and a move to a less 
expensive property (downsizing) thereby releasing some of the equity in the home.   
However the market for equity release products is developing rapidly (discussed later in 
section 7.2).  
Figure 1:  Home Ownership by Age and Census Year 
 
Source: National Affordable Housing Forum Background Paper Number 5, July 2006 
  8The age pension continues to be funded on a pay-as-you-go basis. The current 
expenditures are of the order of 2.4 percent of GDP however, it is expected that this will 
rise as the population ages. This represents around 32 percent of the total income support 
arrangements made by the federal government
2. Expectations for the pension costs have 
been made in the short run and the long run allowing for the demographic transition and 
ageing population. These estimates, shown in Table 4, suggest that the increments in age 
pension payments are of an order of magnitude that is manageable but material.  








Source: Productivity Commission 2005, p 203 
The Australian government is required, under its Charter of Budget Honesty Act 1998, to 
prepare an intergenerational report to assess the long-term sustainability of government 
policies over a 40 year period, including the financial implications of demographic 
change.  Some of the conclusions of the 2003 Report, and a research report from the 
Productivity Commission
3 lie at the heart of the government approach to retirement 
incomes.  These reports conclude that while there will be important fiscal challenges 
arising from the ageing population because of spending pressures in areas such as health, 
age pensions and age care, “population ageing is not a crisis”
4, in part due to it being a 
gradual phenomenon with scope to take some corrective measures.  Also because of its 
system design, Australia does not have large future liabilities associated with age 
pensions because government funded age pensions are not earnings-related and have 
been partly replaced by privately funded superannuation. The government has also 
created a fund, known as the Future Fund, to accumulate sufficient financial assets to 
offset its own unfunded superannuation liability by 2020.
5 
The government expects that the age pension will continue to play a central role in 
providing income to older Australians.  However, there will be a fall in the percentage of 
the aged population which will seek recourse to the full pension as the superannuation 
system matures and people accumulate other assets. 
Some transitional and parametric changes have been made to eligibility to control costs 
and reflect societal change. Men qualify for the age pension at age 65 provided that they 
also meet residency, assets and income based tests. Women had, until more recently, a 
normal age of 60; however, this is gradually being shifted to age 65 using a progressive 
scale based on year of birth. 
                                                 
2 Source: Productivity Commission 2005 page 193. This figure relates to the 2003-04 budget year. 
3 Economic Implications of an Ageing Australia 
4 Ibid p.xxxviii 
5 As at May 2007, this liability stood at around $103 billion and it is expected to grow to around $148 
billion by 2020.  By November 2007 accumulated assets of the fund were $61.5 billion.  
  92.2  Replacement Rates and Pension Eligibility 
When it was introduced in 1908, the age pension was designed to ensure that an 
individual would live in modest comfort: this still remains the aim.  However, as early as 
the mid-1970s, reform proposals began to emerge which sought to shift the emphasis for 
retirement income policy away from poverty alleviation towards income maintenance 
through compulsory superannuation.  This shift towards greater financial independence 
has been given further impetus because of the projected fiscal costs of the ageing 
population which have seen a number of government initiatives to encourage 
independence through deferral of age pension take-up and higher superannuation 
contributions. 
Replacement rates in Australia are very much at the low end of the OECD average.  But 
the system was never designed as a comprehensive social income system. The OECD 
estimates that, when combined with other benefits and particular taxation arrangements in 
place for age pensioners then the gross replacement rate provided by the first pillar in 
Australia is 40 percent and the net replacement rate is 52 percent for a pensioner whose 
pre-retirement income was at the average level. As a result of the means test, the 
replacement rate for a pensioner earning half the average income before retirement was 
estimated to be 65 percent on a gross basis and 77 percent on a net basis. For a pensioner 
earning twice the average before retirement, the estimate is 26 percent gross and 37 
percent net.
6 
The Australian government has not set an explicit replacement rate target for Australia’s 
retirement income system.  However, the former Senate Committee on Superannuation 
noted that there was a strong consensus among superannuation industry representatives 
that an adequate retirement income was between 60 and 65 percent of pre-retirement 
gross income.  
Analysis undertaken by the Treasury’s Retirement Income Modeling Unit (RIM) 
indicates that current policy based on the basic age pension and mandatory and voluntary 
private savings will deliver substantially higher replacement rates in Australia over the 
longer term (Figure 2).  RIM calculates replacement rates based on a comparison of 
potential net expenditure before and after retirement.
7  This includes income from all 
investments, all private pension payments and the age pension, and drawdowns from 
capital less any tax payments. As shown in Figure 2 RIM projects that aggregate 
adequacy rises from around 50 percent at present to around 80 percent and to higher 
levels for people from higher income deciles.  The latter reflects contributions above the 
SG and additional private savings made by higher income groups.  
The effect of the means testing is to limit the eligibility of those of pensionable age to the 
full pension providing instead either a partial pension or no pension at all. Figure 3 shows 
that the trends over the past decade have seen the number of retirees who are eligible to 
receive the age pension rising, although those receiving the full age pension have been 
falling as a proportion of the total. 
 
 
                                                 
6 Source: OECD (2005). 
7 Rothman, G. 2007. 
  10Figure 2: Potential Aggregate Replacement Ratios for Selected Deciles 
 
 
Source:Rothman, G, 2007 
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Source: FaCSIA (various publications) and Staff Analysis 
 
  11This trend would be worrying if it were to continue into the future due to population 
ageing and the effect that this would have on the government’s fiscal position.  This is 
where the SG comes to the rescue by providing growing wealth for the ageing 
population, as the system begins to mature and the level of superannuation assets grows.  
The level of assets accumulated in superannuation is expected to grow substantially over 
the next half century.  As mentioned previously, the incidence of occupational 
superannuation was not widespread until the creation of the compulsory system in 1992.  
Even at that time compulsory contributions were low and did not reach the current level 
of 9 percent until 2002.  However, balances are now rising rapidly. While it is expected 
that the demographic transition will lead to a broadly similar proportion of the population 
of the relevant age being eligible for the age pension, the number of people eligible for 
the full pension gradually declines from current levels of just over 60 percent to just 
below 40 percent (Figure 4).  Conversely the number of people eligible for a part pension 
will rise. 
Figure 4:  Superannuation Assets and Age Pension Coverage Projections 
 
Source: Department of the Treasury, 2007. Intergenerational Report 2007, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra 
2.3  Occupational Schemes and the Superannuation Guarantee 
Although the history of occupational superannuation schemes in Australia dates back to 
before federation, it was not until the middle of the 20
th century that they became a more 
common feature of employment arrangements. Larger employers tended to be the main 
providers of occupational superannuation schemes for their staff. Most often, these 
schemes provided defined benefits with limited portability when the member changed 
employers and with relatively poor vesting of employer contribution related benefits in 
the event of early departure. As such, they strongly favored long term career employees 
with a single firm. Benefits on withdrawal and on retirement tended to be provided as a 
lump sum as the taxation basis was favorable. A limited number of employers, most 
usually life insurance companies and some banks, provided benefits in the form of a 
pension.  
  12Given the relatively small number of schemes that provided pension benefits, integration 
with the means tested first pillar was not common. A culture built up (the ‘lump sum 
mentality’) that encouraged the expectation that a retirement benefit from an occupational 
scheme taken as a lump sum was to be used for early retirement consumption and/or 
invested so as to maintain the entitlement to the first pillar age pension. Although all 
Australians who were employed were able to access schemes operated by life insurance 
companies, particularly directed at the self employed and employees who were not 
covered by an employer sponsored scheme, overall coverage was of the order of 30 
percent under the second pillar
8 (Bateman and Piggott, 1997) for most of the 20
th century 
until the steps taken to secure the second pillar were made in the 1980s. 
The other significant provider of schemes as part of employment arrangements were the 
schemes provided to public sector employees at both the federal and the state levels and 
for various government authorities. These schemes tended to provide defined benefit 
pensions and were operated on a pay-as-you-go basis. 
In the mid 1980s, as part of a national agreement on wage policy, a ‘productivity award 
superannuation’ component of an otherwise proposed wage increase was allocated to be 
made as a contribution to a superannuation scheme. This initiative represented the seed of 
further changes that had a dramatic effect on the superannuation landscape. 
In 1992, the federal government created the ‘superannuation guarantee’ (SG) system. 
Under this system a contribution is paid by employers for all employees to an ‘approved’ 
superannuation scheme
9. The rate of contribution was phased in reaching 9 percent in 
2002
10. The increase in the contribution rate was considered to be consistent with 
productivity growth so as to not pressure real wages to fall. Since that time, various 
policy proposals have been made by several parties to increase this rate or otherwise 
enhance the level of contribution
11. The effect was that, by 1995, coverage had increased 
to around 95%
12.  
The second effect of these arrangements was to vastly increase the level of 
superannuation assets in Australia, and the general public interest in such schemes. It was 
strongly oriented by the deferred pay philosophy so needed to be fully vested from the 
point of the contribution being made and to include both elements of preservation for 
retirement purposes and portability so as not to penalize more transient work patterns. 
A third effect has been to increase the number of schemes operating on a defined 
contribution basis. Although it is possible to maintain defined benefit structures, the 
                                                 
8 Bateman and Piggott. 1997. 
9 There are limited exceptions provided for the SG contribution obligation and these relate to employees 
with very low wages, part time employees under 18 years of age, and employees aged 70 and over. 
10 The timetable for the employer contribution rates was 1992 3% for employers with payrolls less than 
$A1 million and 5% for those with higher payrolls, 1996-98 6 %, 1998-00 7 %, 2000-02 8 %, 2002-03 and 
thereafter 9 %. 
11 In legal effect, the SG does not ‘oblige’ payment into a scheme. However, if no such payment is made 
then a higher rate (the same contribution plus a loading to cover an interest and an administration element) 
is required to be made through the taxation system to the ATO. Employees who have such a payment made 
with respect to them are entitled to claim the normal SG contribution from the ATO and transfer it to a 
scheme of their choice. As a result, employers are strongly incentivised to make the payments to schemes 
rather than through the ATO. 
12 The remaining gaps in coverage are explained by exemptions for some low paid workers, itinerant 
workers, and the continuing lower coverage in the self employed sector. 
  13compliance work required to demonstrate that the scheme meets the SG obligations 
requires a defined benefit scheme to obtain an actuarial certificate. Other legislative 
initiatives have also added to this trend. This consequence is a result of the development 
of initiatives under the deferred pay concept first then the development of special 
procedures for defined benefit schemes so that they can comply with the same general 
requirements. That is, the rules for defined benefit schemes tend to be developed as 
modifications to the rules for defined contribution schemes. It has been popular to close 
defined benefit schemes and replace them, for new employees, with defined contribution 
schemes. It is also possible to offer a transfer from the old scheme to the new scheme 
although not all employers automatically take this option. 
A fourth effect has been to increase the relevance of multi employer schemes and to 
reduce the number of individual employer sponsored arrangements. Originally, under the 
‘productivity award’, employers with employees covered by such an award found 
themselves contributing to an industry scheme as well as, if they had one in place, an 
occupational scheme. Over time, considering administrative efficiency as the main 
argument, employers have tended to migrate their arrangements toward a lesser number 
of schemes. This process was substantially hastened by the introduction of 
comprehensive licensing requirements for pension funds in 2004. The maintenance of a 
single sponsor occupational scheme has become less relevant as companies have opted to 
‘outsource’ arrangements, or have seen the numbers of members in such schemes reduce 
to uneconomic levels. 
Small schemes with less than 5 members known as self managed superannuation funds 
(SMSFs) have also become popular. Originally, small enterprises and family businesses 
established schemes to provide for their SG obligations. It did not take long for these 
schemes to become an attractive source of financing for the business operations or for 
other purposes. Regulations were introduced to limit related investments and money 
belonging to the fund cannot be used for personal or business purposes. To ensure 
adequate control by fund members, all members must be trustees of the fund unless the 
fund employs a professional trustee supervised by APRA. High net worth individuals 
have been encouraged to establish schemes attracted by the greater control that they can 
exercise over the invested funds and the potential for lower charges, particularly after 
taking a benefit from another scheme.  There are currently over 370,000 SMSFs and the 
number of funds is growing at more than 3,500 a month. 
Other efforts have been made to increase the coverage of superannuation. In 1997, a 
‘spouse contribution’ initiative was launched enabling schemes to offer members the 
option to establish a separate member account for their spouse and make additional 
contributions. Most recently, the government has introduced and enhanced a ‘co-
contribution’ where a matching payment is made by the government when members 
make contributions to their scheme
13. 
                                                 
13 The government’s co-contribution was introduced in July, 2003 and matched $1 for $1 of member 
contributions up to a limit of $1,000. The measure was available in full for incomes up to $27,500 when it 
was introduced and subject to a linear phase out up to a maximum level of taxable income at $40,000. In 
2004, the government increased the matching to $1.5 for every $1 up to a limit of $1,500. The benefit 
thresholds were also adjusted to $28,000 and $58,000 respectively, providing a gentler phase out. Eligible 
members receive this payment made to their member account in the superannuation scheme automatically 
through the processing of their tax return. 
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commonly used categorization. 






Single employer sponsored schemes (or established for a corporate group) – employer 
and employee each appoint half the members of the trustee board.  Most schemes are 
DC. Some DB schemes remain but are mostly closed to new members. 
Retail  Publicly offered on a group or individual basis by financial institutions with an 
administration company and trustee company usually a subsidiary of the financial group. 
They are used for personal superannuation, by the self employed and by employers not 
wishing to establish their own superannuation scheme. In some cases, a master trust 
structure is adopted where the trust arrangement allows a single trustee operating under 
an ‘umbrella’ trust deed to administer and manage the superannuation schemes of a 
number unrelated employers or individuals. Now mostly offered on a DC basis, but 
historically some schemes invested in life insurance policies with benefits derived from 
the terms of the underlying insurance contract. 
Industry 
Schemes 
A multi-employer superannuation scheme. Usually covers a specific industry or range of 
industries and will accept contributions from any employers in those industries. Most 
commenced in the mid 1980s and were set up on a pure DC basis with supplementary 
insurance coverage defined with a sum insured in terms of age at death and paid for by a 
premium deduction based on the insurance policy taken out by the scheme. 
Public Sector 
Schemes 
Schemes provided for employees of the government, Federal, state or municipal. A 
separate scheme is operated for the military and, in the case of the states, often for 
emergency services personnel. More recently, there is also a separate scheme for 
universities (collectively) and municipalities. Many DB schemes were closed to new 





Small schemes where all the individual members are also on the board of trustees and 
where there are less than 5 members. Operated fundamentally on a DC basis although it 
is possible that they could have a hybrid basis (so be DB under the law). 
Approved 
Deposit Fund 
A particular type of scheme recognized in the law that is designed to accept benefits 
from other funds and accumulate them until eventual retirement. Often, these schemes 
operate as retail schemes but it is possible to establish them in any category. 
Small funds  Schemes with fewer than 5 members – in these funds the members and trustees are 
identical.  Members who do not wish to operate the fund can appoint an APRA-regulated 
corporate trustee.  There are over 320,000 small fund; most are regulated by the 
Australian Taxation office, with APRA having responsibility for 6,700. 
3  The Product Menu 
At the benefits stage Australians are not limited by any regulation of the products they 
can choose to meet their retirement income needs.  Benefits from private pension 
accumulation may be paid as a lump sum, pension or annuity. Individuals may also rely 
on investment income and capital from their second pillar accumulation, any voluntary 
savings, and also from continuing work of some kind. 
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combinations to meet their retirement income needs.  Some of these products are defined 
in government legislation and provide for a range of taxation benefits.  While income 
streams are not mandatory the government created a range of incentives to encourage 
people to take up these products.  The overall policy objective of retirement income 
streams has been to facilitate capital drawdown over the whole of retirement and target 
concessions to ensure an adequate replacement rate and overall equity.  According to 
Stanhope (2004) the age pension asset test exemption rules are the main incentive rules 
affecting retiree choice of retirement income products.  By investing in assets which 
receive the exemption, many individuals, particularly those with assets between $150,000 
and $350,000 (for singles), gain much greater access to the age pension. 
The main types of income streams are described below.  This part of paper outlines the 
position prior to the end of June 2007.  On 1 July 2007 the government introduced 
significant changes to the tax treatment of superannuation and a simplification of the 
rules applying to some of these products.  These changes are outlined in Section 4. 
3.1  Allocated income streams 
Allocated income streams are the most popular method by which superannuation fund 
members take income streams, representing more than 80 percent of all money invested 
in income streams.  They are account-based schemes which involve an investment 
account within a relevant fund or financial provider. This means that investment risk is 
borne solely by the purchaser. The investment account balance increases as investment 
earnings are added and decreases as regular income payments are made. Most allocated 
income streams offer a range of investment choices.  Regulations require that payments 
must occur at least annually and are subject to minimum and maximum amounts to 
ensure that a mixture of income and capital is drawn down over a period of time 
approximating a person’s life expectancy (these regulations are updated 1 July each 
year). The variance between the minimum and maximums are quite large and a person 
choosing the maximum could face sharply declining income as they age. 
There are two types of allocated income streams—allocated pensions and allocated 
annuities. An allocated pension is a series of regular payments, comprising capital and 
earnings, payable directly from money held in a personal account with a superannuation 
fund including a self-managed superannuation fund.  An allocated annuity provides 
payments comprising capital and earnings under a contract issued by a life insurance 
company. An allocated income stream can only be created with money that is within a 
superannuation fund and certain types of lump sum payments made to an employee on 
termination of employment.  
Survey data indicate that just under a quarter of pensioners draw the minimum pension 
and less than 10 percent draw the maximum pension.  Overall it appears that the tendency 
is for pensioners to take lower pensions reflecting desire to preserve capital.  This view 
about conservatism is supported by data that indicates that the vast majority of pensioners 
seek little or no increases in the annual pension they are drawing, preferring instead to 
preserve capital and experience declines in the real value of their pensions. 
Allocated income streams provide considerable flexibility.  A person typically has access 
to the funds in their investment account and they are able to withdraw all or part at any 
time, but with possible tax implications. 
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contributes to their popularity. 
3.2  Market linked income streams 
A market linked income stream is an account-based product offered by a superannuation 
fund or an annuity provider. They are sometimes referred to as ‘term allocated pensions’ 
(TAPs) or ‘growth pensions’. They were only introduced in September 2004, and have 
not proven very popular. There can be two types of these—market linked pensions and 
market linked annuities. A market linked pension is payable from a superannuation fund, 
whereas a market linked annuity is an annuity contract issued by a life insurance 
company. When creating a market linked income stream a person may only use 
superannuation money’.  
A market linked income stream must have income payments paid for a fixed term. The 
fixed term is determined broadly by reference to a person’s life expectancy at the 
commencement of the income stream.  A person can choose a term anywhere between 
certain minimum and maximum terms. The minimum term must be equal to a person’s 
life expectancy in full years. For a male aged 65, the life expectancy is 17.7 years and 
hence an 18-year term would be relevant. The maximum term is equal to the period from 
the commencement day of the income stream until the primary beneficiary reaches age 
100.  Each year, the account balance is divided by a factor applicable to the remaining 
term. 
To allow some flexibility in the payments from a market linked pension a person can 
select an income stream which is within 10 percent either side of the calculated figure. 
Unlike allocated income streams, market linked income streams are considerably less 
flexible when it comes to accessing the capital investment. Generally, most market linked 
income streams are ‘non-commutable’ unless they are being converted to purchase 
another complying income stream or in circumstances of extreme financial hardship. The 
investment choices available for market linked pensions are virtually the same as are 
available for allocated income streams. After the death of the account holder a 
reversionary benefit can continue to be paid to a spouse of dependent or the balance of 
the account can be paid to a persons’ beneficiary as a lump sum. 
3.3  Lifetime income streams 
A lifetime income stream is one which is guaranteed to be payable for the whole of the 
primary beneficiaries life. There are two types of these—lifetime pensions and lifetime 
annuities. A lifetime pension is provided from a superannuation fund, whereas a lifetime 
annuity is an annuity contract issued by a life insurance company.  As previously 
discussed, Australian’s are not keen on purchasing annuities, and defined benefit 
pensions have been in long term decline. 
A lifetime pension can only be created with money that is within a superannuation fund 
and certain types of lump sum payments made to an employee on termination of 
employment.  On the other hand, lifetime annuities can accept any type of savings, 
superannuation or non-superannuation based, including for example, funds held in bank 
deposit accounts. 
This type of income stream is designed to provide a person with income for life 
regardless of the age of the person. In some cases it may also be possible to have income 
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referred to as a ‘reversionary’ income stream.  Because it is a payment for life, it is not 
uncommon for the payment to be structured to increase annually with movements in 
inflation or some other set rate of increase. 
It is also possible to consider some form of income protection by selecting what is 
generally referred to as a ‘guarantee period’ with the lifetime pension or annuity. Should 
the main beneficiaries die within the guarantee period, income payments may continue to 
another beneficiary until the end of the guarantee period. The most common guarantee 
period selected in the past has been 10 years. Where the income stream is reversionary, it 
is possible to select a guarantee period which is the longer of the beneficiary’s life 
expectancy or the spouse’s life expectancy, but not greater than 20 years. 
With most lifetime income streams the beneficiary does not generally have ready access 
to their money. With some there are cashing rights. 
3.4  Life expectancy income streams 
The life expectancy income streams are guaranteed (usually by the provider of the 
income stream) to be payable for a time period broadly equivalent to the life expectancy 
of the primary beneficiary at the time of purchase. There are two types of life expectancy 
income streams—life expectancy pensions and life expectancy annuities. A life 
expectancy pension is provided from a superannuation fund, whereas a life expectancy 
annuity is an annuity contract issued by a life insurance company. As with other types of 
pensions, only ‘superannuation money’ can be used to invest in a life expectancy 
pension, whereas a life expectancy annuity can be purchased with both superannuation 
and ordinary savings. When a life expectancy income stream is purchased, a person can 
choose the term over which it is payable, subject to certain limits. The term however will 
be fixed from commencement. For example, if a person’s average life expectancy is over 
17.7 years (age 65 male); the minimum term of the investment must be at least 18 years. 
The maximum term of the investment must be equal to the period from the 
commencement day of the income stream until a person reaches age 100. Therefore a 
fixed term of 35 years is permitted.  Payments make also take into account the life 
expectancy of a spouse.  Reversionary benefits can be paid to a spouse r dependent. 
3.5  Fixed term income streams 
A fixed term income stream is simply one that is payable for a set period of time. This 
can be for any period of time, from one year to around 25 years.  There are two types of 
fixed term income streams—fixed term pensions and fixed term annuities. A fixed term 
pension is provided from a superannuation fund, whereas a fixed term annuity is an 
annuity contract issued by a life insurance company.  A fixed term annuity can be 
purchased either with superannuation or ordinary savings. 
A term annuity may allow the purchaser to receive back a percentage of the original 
capital at the expiry of the contract – known as the residual capital value (RCV).  Many 
of the short term annuities specify an income of interest only and 100 percent of capital.  
Survey data (Plan for life, 2007) suggests sales with terms greater than 5 years account 
for over 90 percent of the total.  
Fixed term income streams are inflexible when it comes to accessing invested capital on 
an ongoing basis. While generally most fixed term income streams are commutable (that 
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benefits. This means that except in very limited circumstances, it is preferable not to plan 
to access the capital at any time prior to the end of the term. If the purchaser dies within 
the fixed period, the payments can continue to a beneficiary or to the persons estate, or a 
lump sum may be payable. 
Table 6 provides a summary of the different types of income stream products and shows 
how their features vary. 













Account based  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Annual income payment 
guaranteed 
No No  Yes  Yes 
Investment choice  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Fixed term  Yes  No  No  Yes 
Access to capital  No  Yes  No  No 
Recipient can vary annual 
income received 
No Yes  No  No 
Residual Capital Value allowed  No  n/a  No  No 
Income tested  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Death benefits payable  Yes  Yes  Possible17 Yes 
Source: Department of Families, Community Services, and Indigenous Affairs, “Understanding, Retirement Income 
Streams”. 
Australians are generally advised to give themselves some flexibility to meet unexpected 
lump sum expenses. In relation to lifetime annuities the Department of Families, 
Community Services and Indigenous Affairs advises that “because of [the] restriction on 
accessing your money you should not, as a general rule, invest all of your money in 
them”. (FaCSIA 2007) 
In addition to the range of income stream products Australians also have access to some 
other specific retirement savings products and to a general range of other investment 
options. 
A retirement savings account (RSA) is an account offered by banks, building societies, 
credit unions, life insurance companies and prescribed financial institutions (RSA 
providers). It is used for retirement savings and is similar to a superannuation fund.   
RSAs are capital guaranteed and providers undertake to ensure that fees and charges are 
kept at low levels.  An RSA account is subject to the same taxation and superannuation 
rules as a superannuation fund account, for example it must be preserved until a condition 
of release has been met.  However, because it is a low risk account it offers low returns 
and is considered suitable for small balances, and for people with broken and infrequent 
                                                 
14 Income stream must meet requirements in s.9BA of Social Security Act 1991. 
15 Income stream must meet requirements in s.9BA of Social Security Act 1991. 
16 Income stream must meet requirements in s.9BA of Social Security Act 1991. 
17 Death benefits are payable only when a guarantees period exists and all beneficiaries die within the 
guarantee period. 
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superannuation provider on request.  
The Pension Loans Scheme is available to part-rate pensioners and some self-funded 
retirees who own real estate in Australia. Under this scheme, a person who is of age 
pension age, or the partner of someone who is, may be able to obtain a loan that will 
increase their fortnightly pension payment up to the maximum pension rate. Repayments 
can be made at any time or the debt can be left, including the accrued interest, to be 
recovered from the person’s estate. The loan is secured against the value of any real 
estate they own.  By 2004 fewer than 300 people were participating in the scheme. 
4  Taxation and Social Security Rules 
The regulations surrounding the income tax and age pension means testing treatment of 
retirement income products are important to understanding the benefits and motivations 
of consumers, providers and policymakers. 
Superannuation is a tax-effective investment vehicle1, but is known for its frequent 
legislative change, which in turn has lead to increased complexity, mainly due to efforts 
to ‘grandfather’ existing entitlements from each change. The complexity covers most 
areas of the superannuation system including prudential regulation, taxation and 
disclosure regulation.  
Prior to 1 July 2007 
Due to various policy changes the taxation treatment of retirement incomes became very 
complicated.  The government introduced a major reform of the superannuation system 
effective from 1 July 2007.  It is nevertheless instructive to examine some of the elements 
of the taxation system prior to these changes to understand many of the motivations 
behind the choice by individuals of particular retirement income products. 
Despite the complexity of the system, superannuation saving receives numerous taxation 
concessions which the government valued at $15.0 billion in 2005-2006.  The majority of 
these taxation concessions arise from the concessional taxation of employer contributions 
and the concessional taxation of superannuation fund earnings.  The amount of taxation 
benefit that an individual can receive at a concessional rate of taxation was subject to a 
limit known as the Reasonable Benefits Limit (RBL). The limits in place in June 2007 are 
shown in Table 7. The RBL is the maximum amount of retirement and termination of 
employment benefits that a person can receive over their lifetime at a reduced tax rate.  
Benefits which count towards the RBL include eligible termination payment (like lump 
sums or commutations), superannuation pensions, and purchased pensions and annuities.  
These limits are set for both lump sum payment and for income stream payments (Table 
7).  Amounts paid which exceed the lump sum limit are taxed at the highest personal 
income tax rate.  A person above the pension RBL receiving an income stream will lose 
any concessional tax treatment for that income stream. 
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Table 7:  Reasonable Benefit Limits 
Income Year  Lump Sum (a)(c)  Pension (b)(c) 
2005-06 $648,946  $1,297,886 
2004-05 $619,223  $1,238,440 
2003-04 $588,056  $1,176,106 
2002-03 $562,195  $1,124,384 
2001-02 $529,373  $1,058,742 
2000-01 $506,092  $1,012,181 
Source: Australian Taxation Office Fact Sheet: Reasonable Benefits Limits 
(a) The lump sum RBL usually applies when benefits are taken as a lump sums (ETPs), or as pensions and annuities that do not meet 
the pension and annuity standards. 
(b) To meet the pension RBL a pension or annuity must meet be payable for life or life expectancy, be paid at least annually, and must 
have no residual capital value. Allocated pensions and allocated annuities generally do not meet the pension and annuity standards as 
they have flexible payment amounts and terms. 
(c) For people who take a mixture of lump sum and pension at least half of all benefits must be taken as benefits subject to the 
pensions and annuities standard to be eligible for the pension RBL. 
Pension and annuity payments received by a taxpayer are included in their assessable 
income and are subject to taxation at the general marginal taxation rates. However, 
annuities or pensions paid from a taxed fund to a taxpayer aged 55 or over generally 
attracted a taxation rebate of 15 percent.  This favorable taxation treatment was expected 
to have a major impact in encouraging use of these products but this expectation was 
never fulfilled.  Because the balances within the superannuation system are still building 
up and those reaching retirement at the present time have tended to take lump sums, the 
cost of concessions has been noted in government budget statements as being 
“indeterminate, but likely to be insignificant”
18. 
As mentioned previously a number of common retirement products were also treated 
favorably when calculating a person’s entitlement to the public aged pension.  Any funds 
used to acquire a complying pension or annuity or growth pension income streams are 
partly exempt from the assets test as indicated in Table 8.  Similarly, for the income test 
special rules apply for most income streams because the income stream payments will 
generally include a return of capital.  The treatment of income streams under the income 
and asset tests will differ depending on the characteristics of the income stream, the 
duration over which the income and capital is paid, and the age of the person when 
commencing the income stream. 
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Income tested  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Source: Department of Families, Community Services, and Indigenous Affairs, “Understanding, Retirement Income 
Streams”. 
                                                 
18 Australian Government Tax Expenditures Statement 2005, Table B1: Concessional taxation of funded 
superannuation. 
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Major changes to the treatment of superannuation for people over 60 who have 
superannuation benefits taken from a taxed super fund became effective on 1 July 2007. 
The changes seek to provide greater incentives to invest in superannuation by simplifying 
the arrangements for the taxation of benefits and reducing the amount of tax levied from 
benefits paid. The main changes are as follows: 
•  All lump sum benefits paid from a taxed source (such as a superannuation fund) 
will be tax free;  
•  All pensions paid from a taxed source will be tax free; 
•  Reasonable benefit limits will be abolished; and 
•  A person who receives a lump sum superannuation payment or a pension payment 
from a taxed source will not need to file a taxation return. 
Taxed funds cover around 90 percent of Australian employees and are typically private 
sector accumulation funds. Presently, the taxation arrangements for receiving lump sum 
superannuation benefits are more complex.  Superannuation lump sum benefits paid from 
a taxed source comprise up to eight different components that are each subject to 
different taxation arrangements. 
In addition, the complicated system of age-based limitations on contributions which 
receive concessional taxation treatment will be removed and replaced with a fully 
deductible limit of $50,000 irrespective of age.  The amount that can be contributed at 
concessional rates is limited to control the use of concessions by high net worth 
individuals. Contributions for the self-employed will be fully deductible and the 
opportunity to participate in the co-contribution will now be available to the self-
employed. The present tax on contributions and earnings of 15 percent will remain, as 
will the preservation age.  
Every ‘complying’ income stream product bought on or after the implementation date (20 
September 2007 for this proposal) will be fully asset tested. Currently, if an income 
stream product meets certain requirements, it was either 50 or 100 percent exempt from 
the assets test, depending on the date it was bought. This means that the value of some 
people’s assets will increase as calculated under the assets test. 
However, to compensate the growing number of retirees for the loss of these concessions 
the rate at which a person’s age pension entitlements are reduced under the assets test is 
to be lowered, from $3 per fortnight for every $1000 of assets above the lower pension 
assets test threshold to $1.50 for every $1000 in assets above these thresholds. The 
reduction in the assets-test taper rate is designed to increase incentives to save and boost 
the retirement incomes of pensioners whose rate of payment is determined by the assets-
test. It will also increase the number of people who are eligible for a part pension and the 
associated concessions. 
There will be a simplification of the minimum drawdown rates which will set a standard 
for the payment of a minimum amount annually (no maximum limits will apply), no 
provision of residual amounts and transfers only to a pensioner’s dependents or estate on 
death.  The proposed changes to the required annual minimum drawdown rates for 
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depleted at a faster rate than would be the case under current arrangements. This may 
lead to retiree’s private superannuation pensions ceasing to be paid before the person 
dies. 
The removal of tax on funded lump sums paid to those over age 60, and changes to the 
treatment of income streams for social security purposes reduces the bias in the system 
for a retiree to receive the benefits as an income stream and erode some of the benefits 
currently given to annuities and complying pensions. This could lead to an increase in the 
number of benefits taken as a lump sum and an increased risk that retirees would waste 
the lump sum amount.  However earnings on assets supporting these pensions remain tax 
exempt providing a modest incentive for people to draw income streams on retirement.  
5  Oversight – Regulation and Supervision 
5.1  Institutional Structures 
The life insurance sector oversight was established formally under a law first passed in 
1945. Non life supervision was extended in 1973. Superannuation fund regulation was, as 
a result of the constitutional arrangements, largely dealt with through taxation laws until 
the establishment of the Insurance and Superannuation Commission in 1987 bringing life, 
non life and superannuation oversight together. 
The current institutional structures established to oversee the financial sector, including 
the pension fund and life insurance sectors, emerged following a wide ranging inquiry 
initiated by the government in 1996 (the ‘Financial System Inquiry’, known also as the 
‘Wallis Inquiry’). The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) is responsible 
for the prudential regulation of institutions involved in deposit-taking, life and general 
insurance and superannuation.  The Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
(ASIC) is responsible for market integrity, consumer protection and corporate financial 
behavior. 
5.2  APRA 
APRA was established in 1998 under the APRA Act. It is a statutory authority under the 
legislation overseen by a management group of three members appointed by the 
Commonwealth Treasurer; a chairman, deputy chairman and one other member. 
APRA sees its role as establishing and enforcing prudential standards and practices 
designed to ensure that, under all reasonable circumstances, financial promises made by 
institutions which it supervises are met within a stable, efficient and competitive financial 
system.  APRA adopts a similar supervisory approach to both life insurance and 
superannuation.  The main differences arise only in relation to capital adequacy and 
funding requirements or due to the different legislative bases under which the industries 
are regulated.  The Australian Constitution gives the federal government powers to 
regulate insurance but does not give it specific powers to regulate superannuation which 
is regulated subject to the Commonwealth’s taxation and age pension powers. 
APRA has adopted a risk based supervisory approach for both insurance and 
superannuation.  The two supervisory tools (PAIRS and SOARS) are designed to ensure 
that APRA supervisors assess risks rigorously and consistently and that any supervisory 
interventions are targeted and timely. The PAIRS model seeks to calculate an ‘overall 
risk of failure’ for supervised entities.  This is an assessment of the likelihood that the 
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policyholders and superannuation fund members).   SOARS provides a framework of 
supervisory stances which can be adopted depending on the level of risk in each 
institution.  
There are four supervisory stances involving a step-up in the intensity of APRA’s 
involvement. ‘Normal’ means that no special action is taken beyond regular supervision 
activities. Institutions in ‘Oversight’ have some aspect of their risk position or operations 
— such as minor but persistent weaknesses in the control framework or insufficient 
capital — that requires more extensive examination by APRA. ‘Mandated Improvement’ 
institutions are operating outside APRA’s acceptable bounds for prudent risk 
management. These institutions must have acceptable plans to correct the deficiencies, 
and they are likely be subject to more intense supervisory attention Institutions in 
‘Restructure’ are no longer viable in their current form and need some combination of 
new management, new ownership or new capital, or a new business arrangement.  
The main differences between insurance and superannuation supervision were that until 1 
July 2004, only the trustees of for-profit retail funds open to members of the public rather 
than to employees of a particular employer were required to meet entry threshold tests of 
capital and capacity and go through a licensing process. However, in July 2004 a new 
licensing system commenced, for all trustees of prudentially regulated funds. All trustees 
must now be licensed by APRA, and all superannuation funds with a licensed trustee 
must be registered. The universal licensing regime brings superannuation funds into line 
with all other regulated financial institutions and permits APRA to identify, and to bar, 
problematic trustees before they have accepted any investments 
5.3  Capital, Funding, Solvency 
5.3.1  Pension Funds 
The core concept of the funding regulation in the SIS law is divided between 
accumulation schemes (DC) and defined benefit (DB) schemes. The definition separating 
these two classes of scheme relies on defining the defined benefit scheme and then 
considering all other types of scheme as DC. The effect of the law is to restrict the more 
straightforward rules applying to DC schemes to those schemes that do not carry material 
levels of risk that would be normally associated with a DB scheme. Hybrid schemes, 
which offer both DC and DB are, for funding regulation purposes, classified as DB 
schemes.  A defined benefit is interpreted to include schemes that provide a defined 
conversion factor for a pension benefit or some other form of defined benefit. DC 
schemes are permitted to provide defined benefits for death or invalidity during the 
accumulation phase without risking their DC status. It is also possible for a DC scheme to 
be capital guaranteed (i.e., guaranteed not to credit members with a negative earning 
rate). Finally, a DC scheme can provide ‘member protection’ meaning that it may 
guarantee that the earnings will not be less than the expenses charged (i.e. the 
accumulated value of the member account will not be eroded due to the income being 
less than the expense charges otherwise due) and this may be provided for a subset of the 
members if desired. 
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For DC scheme the rules place the obligation on the trustees to make the assessment of 
the solvency of the scheme. The basis of the test is that the scheme should be ‘technically 
solvent’
19. A reference to a DC scheme being solvent is defined as the scheme having a 
‘net realizable value of the assets’ equal to or greater than ‘the minimum guaranteed 
benefits of members’. The ‘net realizable value of the assets’ is defined as the market 
value less the estimated cost of disposal (illustrated in Figure 5). The ‘minimum 
guaranteed benefits of members’ is made up of the accumulated value (with interest and 
less expense charges) of member and SG and award employer contributions, both 
required to be fully and immediately vested in the member on payment, and to the extent 
that they become vested, any other contributions made by employers or transfers into the 
scheme. These benefits also include the vested benefits arising from transfers into the 
scheme
20. 
Reserves in a DC scheme may arise from specific contributions from the sponsor for the 
purpose, or from investment returns in excess of that credited to the various accumulating 
balances, or from the difference between the charges made on member accounts and the 
actual cost of the services (for example, rebates received on insurance arrangements) or 
from the unvested benefits of members who withdraw early or from other sources. These 
reserves may be considered to support a smoothing of crediting rates over time, an 
element of mismatch in the investment strategy, the provision of a guarantee on account 
balances when assets are not invested fully in assets of a capital guaranteed nature, or to 
pay for the cost of member protection, amongst other purposes. They may even be used 
to facilitate the retention of some of the death and disability risk rather than to insure it in 
full. There is a prohibition on deferring costs so it is not possible to reduce expense 
charges in the current period in the expectation that they will be recovered at a later date 
(i.e. smoothing of expenses is not permitted)
21. 
                                                 
19 Division 9.6 of the SIS Regulations provides definitions. 
20 The concept of vested benefits can be considered to be the benefit that a member would receive if they 
voluntarily withdrew from the scheme. 
21 SIS Regulation 5.18 



























































All funds are expected to have policies in areas such as a crediting rate policy or an 
insurance risk policy or an investment policy such that the level of risk actually retained 
is manageable. Developing these policies, in the case some risk is retained, is expected to 
include sophisticated risk analysis and, as most schemes have only small reserves, it is 
generally the case that trustees seek to avoid rather than retain and manage risks. Aside 
from the fiduciary liability of the trustees, retention and management of risk requires a far 
more extensive and detailed policy to be developed than the policy that simply does not 
retain the risk at all. 
In the event that a scheme is determined to be solvent at the beginning of the accounting 
and reporting year, then the trustees may increase the benefits (usually through the 
process of determining the addition of investment earnings) but are not permitted to 
increase the amounts to such an extent that the scheme would become insolvent at the 
end of the year. In other words, the trustees may not increase benefits by more than the 
scheme can afford. This obliges trustees to consider the actual solvency position before 
adding to benefits. 
If the scheme is technically insolvent, it is still possible to add to the benefits in certain 
circumstances. First of all, a scheme must obtain the report of an actuary and that report 
should propose an arrangement where the scheme would be expected to become solvent 
again within not more than five years. If this is not possible then the scheme must be 
wound up. Second, any addition must only be made after the actuary has approved it and 
it is in compliance with the arrangement to restore the scheme solvency. During a period 
of insolvency, any payment from the scheme is also banned except with the approval of 
the actuary. Such an arrangement also has to have the approval of the supervisory 
authority. 
 
  26Defined Benefit Schemes 
For defined benefit schemes, the key concept is that the financial position is 
“unsatisfactory” as outlined in the legislation and related regulations. These rules rely on 
and place obligations on the actuary or auditor to report to the supervisor and the scheme 
trustees if they form “the opinion that the financial position of the entity may be, or may 
be about to become, unsatisfactory”
22. From a legislative perspective the solvency of a 
DB scheme is measured with reference to the Minimum Benefit Index (MBI) and is 








where NRV is the net realizable value of the assets, BEF is the value of the benefit 
entitlements of former members
23 and FMRB is the ‘funded minimum requisite benefits’ 
arising from an employers SG obligation (illustrated in Figure 6).  This calculation is 
made after setting aside the benefits of former members of the fund, including pension 
beneficiaries. 
All defined benefit funds must have an actuarial investigation at least every three years.  
Such an investigation values the assets and liabilities of the fund and determines whether 
they are adequate to fund accrued benefits of members.  Actuarial projections for long-
term investment returns and wage growth are key assumptions in this process.  The 
actuary also recommends the rate at which employer contributions should be made for 
the next three years. A DB Scheme must also have a ‘funding and solvency certificate’ 
from the scheme actuary. It specifies a minimum level of contribution and the frequency 
of their payment that should be made by the employer sponsor that is ‘reasonably 
expected by the actuary to be required to secure the solvency’ of the minimum requisite 
benefits. 
If the scheme has a MBI less than 1 it is considered to be technically insolvent under the 
law. This triggers the requirement for a program to resolve the situation or, failing that, 
for the fund to be wound up. Schemes in this state must also have a new funding and 
solvency certificate prepared and then renewed not less frequently than annually during 
the resolution stage. These special funding and solvency certificates specify contributions 
required with the aim to restore solvency over a period not exceeding five years so, in a 
normal course, are designed with the assumption of the continuing availability of the 
employer sponsor to meet these contributions.  
The funding and solvency certificate also should consider adverse situations where it may 
cease to become valid. Such situations may be many and varied and depend on the 
particular financial circumstances of the scheme as well as the level of benefits provided 
in different circumstances. For example, where a scheme provides for one benefit on 
normal resignation but for a higher benefit on early retirement, it would normally be 
expected that the actuary would allow for the demographic progress of the membership 
over the next five years and anticipate any increase in members taking early retirement as 
                                                 
22 SIS Act Section 130 (1) (a) 
23 In the case of a scheme providing pensions, former members includes current pensioners. 
  27part of the normal calculation of the minimum contribution rate
24. Another example 
would be the case where normal resignation benefits are increased (say by not imposing a 
vesting effect on otherwise unvested contributions) in the event of redundancy. In the 
event that a large and unexpected redundancy program was implemented in the future 
then this may lead to a need to revise the minimum contribution rate. In this second case, 
the actuary may specify this case as a ‘notifiable event’ where the trustees are obliged to 
notify the actuary and the certificate may cease to have effect and a new certificate will 
be required. 





































In the early 1990s the presumption was that the market for superannuation pensions 
would be restricted to relatively secure superannuation funds operated by governments, 
those sponsored by large employers, or those arranged by life insurance companies. 
However, government polices to encourage more superannuation funds to offer long term 
retirement income streams in the late 1990s raised concerns that some funds might not 
have the capacity to ensure payment over the long term of such pensions.  In early 1999 
APRA issued rules giving it the ability to seek an annual actuarial investigation of 
superannuation funds paying pensions with respect to the probability that the pensions 
will continue to be paid under the governing rules of the fund.  This built on the existing 
requirement that DB funds were required to prepare the triennial actuarial investigation.  
The 1999 requirements highlighted the need for a fund to be in a satisfactory financial 
position as demonstrated by strong actuarial ratios such as the vested benefits index 
(VBI) and the accrued benefits index (ABI) which go beyond the MBI requirements
25.  
                                                 
24 For example, in such a case, the actuary may recommend higher contributions in the initial years and 
lower contributions in the later years. 
25 However, many DB funds offer benefits that call for significantly higher contributions than the statutory 
minimum. 
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that a fund would be required to pay if all members were to voluntarily leave the fund on 
the valuation dates, together with the value of all pensions.  The ABI provides an 
indication of progress towards funding member’s accrued retirement and other benefits.  
These benefits represent the present value of expected future benefits arising in respect of 
membership of the fund up to the valuation date.  The VBI indicates whether the fund is 
in an unsatisfactory financial position as defined in the regulations but there is also an 
expectation by APRA that the ABI should be greater than 100 percent.  The actuarial 
standards also make it clear that actuaries should set funding rates which keep a fund’s 
VBI above 1. 
These measures of fund solvency have not, until recently, been made public by APRA.  
However, in response to concerns about the ability of defined benefit funds to meet their 
obligation following the stock market correction in 2002 APRA undertook a “health 
check” of all defined benefit funds to assess their solvency.  Subsequently, in March 2007 
APRA, for the first time, reported information about the VBI for defined benefit and 
hybrid funds.  
Figure 7: Vested Benefit Index (VBI) – June 2006 
 
Source: APRA Annual Superannuation Bulletin June 2006 
As demonstrated in Figure 7, over 91 percent of defined benefit and hybrid funds 
reported a VBI of at least 100 percent at June 2006. The majority of funds that reported a 
VBI of less than 100 percent were unfunded public sector funds. Just over 96 percent of 
non-public sector funds reported a VBI of at least 100 percent. 
5.3.2  Life Insurance Companies 
Australia developed a well respected system of financial reporting and capital obligations 
for life insurance companies when it completely overhauled the legislation and regulation 
of life insurance companies in the early 1990s.  The regulatory regime is governed 
  29primarily by the Life Insurance Act 1995 and by prudential standards issued by APRA
26.  
This legislation establishes a two tier regulatory regime for life companies: the first tier is 
Solvency and the second Tier is Capital Adequacy.  Profits are reported based on Policy 
Liabilities which are the sum of “best estimate” liabilities and future profit margins. 
The Overall Approach in Summary 
Three separate but related valuations are carried out. The methodology is similar but the 
assumptions are different in each case and there are some additional provisions applied. 
1.  The Best Estimate Valuation: This valuation, using assumptions that are neither 
deliberately conservative nor optimistic, determines the fundamental provision for 
the contracts. At the point that the contract is issued, the best estimate valuation 
will be different to the premiums charged. This difference represents the profit (or 
loss) that will result from the contract if these assumptions are borne out in 
practice. For the contract, as the valuation is done on a contract by contract basis, 
this margin is then treated as follows: 
If it is positive, then the profit margin is expressed as a margin on the service 
provided (termed the ‘profit carrier’). For example, for a life annuity the margin 
may be a percentage of the annuity payments themselves. A provision is then 
established as the present value of the ‘future profit margins’. In aggregate, the 
best estimate liability and the present value of future profit margins will then be 
equal to the premium at the point the contract is issued. 
If the margin is negative, then the profit margin is set to zero. 
2.  The Solvency Liability: The solvency standard is based largely on a run-off 
assessment of the company. 
3.  The Capital Adequacy Liability: The capital adequacy standard considers a going 
concern assessment including a need to reflect on the future capacity of the 
company to meet business plan objectives for new business and continue to meet 
the solvency standard. 
The approach is not explicitly a risk-based approach in the sense that set risk factors are 
used in calculating the value of assets, liabilities and sums insured.  However, it does 
seek to take into account risk factors and the likely volatility of assets and liabilities 
through the use of conservative prudential buffers.  These buffers attempt to put a value 
on the impact of economic shocks such as a significant fall in equity markets, sudden 
changes in interest rates or other adverse events, and to ensure that adequate reserves are 
held in order to mitigate the impact of these events.  
Most life insurers hold assets in excess of the capital adequacy requirements and many 
have a policy of monitoring these excess or “free assets” against what is known as a 
target surplus.  The target surplus has been described by the Institute of Actuaries as “an 
amount of buffer capital, additional to regulatory requirements, that a life insurance 
company chooses to hold, given its risk tolerance levels, to allow for adverse 
performance
27. Although there are no regulatory requirements in relation to the target 
                                                 
26 Prior to January 2008 responsibility for setting actuarial standards rested with the Life Insurance 
Actuarial Standards Board. 
27 Australian Institute of Actuaries, Life Financial Reporting Tax and Legislation Sub Committee 
Discussion Note: “Target Surplus”, April 2006. 
  30surplus, and APRA has observed that the methodologies and rationale behind the 
development of target surplus by life insurers varies widely.  Nevertheless, APRA has 
signaled its increasing focus on the target surplus policies and practices of insurance 
companies.  APRA is interested in seeing that the life insurer (and its Board) has 
developed a target surplus philosophy, that it have considered the desired level of 
probability of failure, and that are steps in place to deal with the situation when the target 
surplus level is under pressure. APRA expects the Appointed Actuary to comment on 
whether a target surplus philosophy has been developed, how the present capital position 
measures up against the target, and what action steps, if any, are planned. 
APRA has noted that “the level of free assets that an insurer holds above its regulatory 
requirements is a matter for the insurer itself.  However, the way an insurer manages and 
develops its target surplus, and the level of this surplus, bears on APRA’s own risk rating 
of the insurer and, hence, on the level of resources which APRA devotes to its 
supervision”.
28  This focus on the target surplus also moves APRA towards the Solvency 
II capital model being developed in Europe.  This model draws on the Basel II approach 
to banking and has three components – solvency capital, minimum capital and 
supervisory review. 
The role of statutory funds 
The Australian law requires that life insurance companies operate a series of ‘statutory 
funds’ and that policies issued are attributed to a fund. Although the legal structure is that 
the fund is part of the company accounts and not a separate legal entity, there are some 
constraints and protections provided that separates the funds from other assets and 
liabilities of the insurer. 
Companies may, and often do, establish separate funds for particular business lines. It has 
been popular to establish a separate statutory fund for annuity business. Although this 
practice has considerable administrative advantages, and facilitates the management of 
asset liability risks, one additional reason could be the favorable taxation result that 
would emerge as the investment earnings on free capital in the annuity statutory fund 
would be subject to a lower tax rate. 
                                                 
28 APRA, “APRA Insight, Quarter 2, 2004 























  32The first step – Best Estimate Valuations and Profit Margins 
The determination of the liabilities for life insurance companies is governed by a 
Prudential Standard issued by APRA
29. This standard forms the basis for all actuarial 
valuations of policies issued by life insurance companies and the public reporting of 
information that is ‘realistic’ as well as reflecting a ‘proper and timely release of profit’ 
and the disclosure of information that is ‘transparent and comparable’. 
The standard does not prescribe a single method of valuation of policy liabilities, rather 
setting out detailed principles. Normally, but not in every case, a prospective approach is 
taken using discounted cash flow techniques and this would be the case with respect to 
annuity business. 
The basic policy liability reflects both the value of the benefit payments and the value of 
expected expenses. The actuary is obliged to reflect assumptions about future investment 
returns, inflation, taxation, expenses, mortality and morbidity, policy discontinuance, and 
reinsurance. Where the distribution of likely outcomes is reasonably expected to be 
symmetric then assumptions of a more deterministic nature reflecting the mean are to be 
adopted. If, however, significant optionality or other circumstances exist then the actuary 
must consider these in determining the approach taken. Also, if adversity is likely to be 
correlated, then this has to be given consideration. 
With respect to investment earnings, the standard directs the actuary to the actual assets 
backing the liabilities. As a result, where the asset portfolio has unique features, it is open 
to the actuary to reflect this in the discount rate assumption. This is in contrast to the 
alternative approach where the actuary would base the discount rate on risk free assets 
even where the investment policy does not and is unlikely to lead to such assets being 
held in practice. Consequently, the discount rate should reflect credit risk and any 
prepayment risk in the case of fixed interest assets rather than a separate allowance being 
made for these risks. Taxation of insurers is also reflected in the assumptions of the base 
liability rather than elsewhere. For annuities, the taxation basis for providers implies that 
they largely exempt investment income from tax and assume a gross or tax rate. 
Allowance for expenses has to consider the expected servicing cost both in terms of 
administration and the management of investments. As such, the liability established 
should be sufficient to cover both the benefits themselves and the cost of providing them. 
Special attention is given to outsourced arrangements. In such cases, where the potential 
administrative cost is higher through direct management and the contract is not at ‘arms 
length’ then the higher cost should be reflected.  
The standard has the effect that profit emerges over the life of the contract as the services 
are provided. Each year, the planned profit margin will be translated into actual profit in 
line with the service delivered. In addition, as the assumptions are estimates, there will be 
some variation (positive and negative) from these assumptions and this is called the 
‘experience profit or loss’. Companies report both figures. The emerging planned profit 
may be considered to reflect the underlying long term business performance from the 
contracts and the experience profit or loss as variation around this mean. Normally, 
                                                 
29 Prior to 1 January 2008 Standards were set by the Life Insurance Actuarial Standards Board (LIASB) 
which was vested with responsibility for this task under the Life Insurance Act.  From 1 January 2008 
APRA has responsibility for issuing all standards; it has reissued the standards, and he LIASB has ceased 
to exist. 
  33experience profits and losses are small relative to planned profit emergence so profit 
reporting results should be relatively smooth. However, because assets are valued at 
market, then there is an element of variability from investment market volatility and this 
is the main cause of experience profits or losses (see below regarding updating profit 
margins). 
A key principle is that profits are earned in a manner that is neither deferred nor 
prematurely recognized. The choice of the profit carrier is critical to this outcome. Profits 
are to be earned on the later of the provision of the service and the receipt of the income 
relating to the service. In the case of annuities, this would always be the provision of the 
service given that all premiums are received at inception of the contract. 
As noted above, although profits are recognized over the life of the contract, losses tend 
to be recognized immediately. The effect of this obligation is to strongly discourage loss 
making pricing even in the short term. Although pricing is not regulated directly, 
companies are obliged to obtain actuarial advice on pricing and the supervisor can 
determine, from the reports on experience profits and losses and the actuarial financial 
condition report, whether prices are considered sustainable. 
As experience emerges, the actuary determines if the change compared to the 
assumptions is transitory or expected to be a permanent feature in future. Where it is 
transitory, the effect of the favorable or unfavorable experience will be reflected in the 
current year profit (particularly the experience profit). Where the change is permanent, 
the effect is reflected in a change in the profit margin. When adverse, the profit margin is 
reduced and the present value of future profit margins is reduced correspondingly. The 
result, in such a case, is that the effect of the change emerges over the life of the contract 
as the now lower profit margin emerges. When sufficiently adverse to lead to the profit 
margin becoming negative then, as the PVPM cannot be negative (treated as an asset) the 
losses are capitalized and reflected immediately. A third case, when previous 
considerations have led to negative profit margins but this adversity is now considered to 
be less severe, is treated as a special case. The profit can emerge immediately up to the 
point when the profit margin becomes positive again when it is reflected and emerges 
through the profit carrier mechanism once again. Profits can be ‘released’ to the extent 
that previously recognized losses have been recognized. 
Although of limited practical relevance to annuities as the volumes are small, provision is 
made for participating contracts. In this case, the liability separates the future profits 
between the expected bonuses and the expected shareholder component of these profits. 
With respect to annuities, one normal profit carrier is the payment of annuity benefits. 
This means that the profits emerge in proportion to the actual annuity payments. The 
service of establishing the contract is permitted as a secondary profit carrier however 
caution is expressed in the standards about more than one profit carrier to ensure that 
profit is not realized and released prematurely. Once chosen, the profit carrier has to be 
used consistently so the decision is somewhat ‘cast in stone’. Even if a profit carrier is 
changed along the way, the profit margins are recalculated so that no profit release takes 
place as a result of the change itself. 
The consequence of these rules is that annuity profits emerge largely over time as the 
annuity payments are made, that the provision includes allowance for taxes and expenses 
as well as benefits on a ‘best estimate’ basis plus the emergence of a profit on the 
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to emerge over time. The Solvency and Capital Adequacy standards build on this basic 
premise. 
The Solvency Standard 
The basic philosophy of the solvency standard is to ensure that the company has 
sufficient resources to meet currently committed obligations. As such, it is a ‘run-off’ 
basis although the usual course would be to transfer the obligations and their associated 
assets to another firm. When a company finds itself in the situation where such a closure 
to new business and transfer are contemplated, it may also find that difficulties arise that 
compound the problems and, therefore, some provision for conservatism is justified. 
Also, it can be expected that strong supervisory pressure and intervention will be 
occurring at the same time. The solvency requirement is expressed as the difference 
between the liability determined on best estimates and that determined on a more 
conservative basis. 
The Life Insurance Act establishes that the solvency standard should ensure, as far as 
practicable, that ‘at any time, the financial position of each statutory fund of a life 
company is such that the company will be able, out of the assets of the fund, to meet all 
policy and other liabilities referable to the fund at that time as they become due’. This 
definition highlights that the Act envisages solvency on a fund by fund basis rather than 
for the company as a whole. The standard is deliberately prescriptive. Although it 
describes this as being ‘to facilitate comparability across the industry’ it is understood 
also that a more prescriptive approach is required compared to the capital standard for 
legally enforceable reasons – it is necessary to define the ‘line in the sand’. 
Although the statutory funds should largely be able to support themselves financially, the 
standard does also reflect some interaction between the shareholder’s fund and the 
statutory funds.  
The solvency requirement considers a specific solvency liability. For annuities, as with 
most of the other business of the company, the mortality table and rates of improvement 
are prescribed for this valuation. It is recognized that the solvency liability will be more 
conservative (anticipates more adverse experience) than the best estimate liability. 
Additionally, the solvency requirement adds obligations relating to other (non-policy) 
obligations
30, expenses, asset liability mismatches, and inadmissible assets
31. With 
respect to expenses, the Best Estimate Liability already allows for expected expenses. 
The Solvency ‘Expense Reserve’ makes provision for overruns in expenses that may 
occur where a fund is forced to operate on a closed basis. Mismatch is established 
through a ‘resilience reserve’ determined through a stress test to determine the net effect 
of movements in asset and liability values in defined scenarios. 
                                                 
30 This part of the standard also addresses the situations where subordinated debt can be excluded from the 
liabilities (so included in capital). 
31 Inadmissible asset reserves provide for assets held that may have limited value in a run off situation or 
may not be directly available to meet policyholder benefits. In general, these are assets that depend on the 
ongoing conduct of the business, associated financial entities, but also concentrated asset exposures. As 
such, the requirements address elements of group capital as well as credit and liquidity risks. 
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available discretions open to the company when assessing the solvency risk. The ability 
to reduce bonuses can be taken as a credit. 
As such, the solvency requirement could be considered to be a margin determined as a 
stress test supplemented by specific provisions for certain risks not provided for directly 
in the basic policy liability. The basic policy liability is a floor for the solvency liability 
as is the value available to customers on voluntary termination. 
The Capital Adequacy Standard 
The focus of the capital adequacy standard is to ensure the financial soundness of the life 
company as a going concern. The capital adequacy standard for a statutory fund is aimed 
at ensuring the fund can remain financially viable, continues to write new business, and is 
likely to meet the solvency requirement for the next 3 years with a high degree of 
probability. Some of its elements are less conservative than the solvency standard 
because it is based on a continuing rather than a close down scenario, but the new 
business growth plans can make it more onerous than the solvency standard. Also, the 
capital adequacy requirements can not be less than the solvency requirements, so in 
practice they are quite similar for mature stable funds, but capital adequacy is more 
onerous for quickly growing funds. 
The capital adequacy standard adopts a less prescriptive approach than the solvency 
standard, recognizing different business strategies of life companies.  This means that 
much reliance is placed on the role of the Appointed Actuary for assessment of capital 
adequacy requirements. 
Failure to meet the capital adequacy standard raises concerns with the regulator and 
would lead to a call for remedial action. 
6  Trends in Industry Composition 
6.1  Superannuation Funds 
The vast expansion in coverage and gradual increase in the contribution rate brought 
about a huge rise in annual contribution flows (Table 9). These equaled 7 percent of GDP 
in 2001. After a brief decline in 2002 and 2003, they rebounded sharply and reached 11.8 
percent of GDP in 2007. Adding investment income and allowing for the young age of 
the new pillar (which implies relatively low levels of benefits and withdrawals, which 
amounted to 4 percent of GDP in 2007), the overall result was a massive increase in the 
level of superannuation assets, which reached 106 percent of GDP in June 2007 (Table 
10). 
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Year to June or end June  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
          
GDP  (AUD  billion)  711.3 759.0 809.7 859.7 933.7  1003.5  1083.8 
           
Contributions  (AUD  billion)  50.1 51.6 53.5 60.8 68.9  85.1  122.6 
Contributions  (%  of  GDP)  7.0 6.8 6.6 7.1 7.4  8.5  11.3 
           
Benefits  (AUD  billion)  30.6 32.6 33.2 30.7 32.6  37.7  41.1 
Benefits  (%  of  GDP)  4.3 4.3 4.1 3.6 3.5  3.8  3.8 
           
Total  Assets  (AUD  billion)  519.0 518.1 546.7 641.0 759.3  917.8  1143.2 
Total  Assets  (%  of  GDP)  73.0 68.3 67.5 74.6 81.3  91.5  105.5 
Source: IFS and APRA, Annual Superannuation Bulletin, June 2007 
 
Table 10: Superannuation Fund Assets by Type of Fund 
  1995 2000 2006 2007 
  percent of total assets 
Corporate  21.4 13.8  5.7  6.1 
Industry  4.4 10.1 16.6 17.3 
Public Sector  22.7 21.1 16.7 15.5 
Retail (incl RSAs and ERFs)  22.7 27.5 32.8 32.3 
Small Funds  8.7 15.5 23.6 25.1 
Balance of Statutory Funds*  20.1 12.0  4.8  3.7 
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Total (AUD billion)  229 484 918  1143 
Total (% of GDP)  49 74 92  106 
Source: APRA 
Of funds with more than four members in June 2006, some 66 percent were 
accumulation, or defined contribution, funds and another 28 percent were in funds 
offering a combination of accumulation and defined benefits. Only 7 percent were in pure 
defined benefit funds, compared with 22 percent ten years before. While the importance 
of defined benefit funds has declined sharply in the past decade, the reported assets of 
defined benefit funds understate the present value of their future payment obligations 
because some large public sector schemes are not fully funded.  
The Productivity Award and Superannuation Guarantee developments were a large 
contributor to the trend toward defined contribution arrangements. Multi employer 
arrangements were established under the auspices of trade unions, industry associations 
and by other promoters on a defined contribution basis to assist in compliance with the 
SG requirements. In addition, there was a general transition where the extremely 
generous taxation benefits for superannuation were wound back. Legislation for both the 
new positive coverage arrangements and the taxation elements tended to be developed 
with a view to DC schemes first and defined in terms of contributions (reflecting the 
deferred pay approach) then adjusted to include how DB schemes could also comply with 
the regulation. DB compliance often required additional actuarial certification (for 
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SG obligations). As a result, many employers revisited their ongoing interest and cost 
effectiveness in maintaining their single employer DB schemes and many have since 
been closed to new members, and in a large number of cases, wound up transferring 
members to DC schemes 
All classes of funds (other than ‘small funds’) have been consolidating for some time. 
Corporate funds have declined particularly rapidly in both number and share of industry 
assets as costs of administration have increased and the introduction of near-universal 
employer superannuation has eroded any competitive benefits from offering in-house 
superannuation. Public sector funds have also experienced large declines. In contrast, 
industry funds and especially retail and small funds have registered large increases in 
market shares.
32 
The consolidation trend was given substantial new impetus by the recent introduction of 
more stringent prudential regulations, including for fund governance and risk 
management, and the requirement that all funds be licensed by the middle of 2006.  As a 
result, the number of funds, excluding ‘small funds’ and pooled trusts was 575 at end-
June 2007, almost one-tenth of their number 12 years earlier (Table 11).  
Table 11: Number of Superannuation Funds by Type 
  1995 2000 2007 
     
Corporate 4,211  3,389  289 
Industry 152  155  74 
Public  Sector  97 81 40 
Retail  541 293 172 
Subtotal 5,001  3,918  575 
Small  Funds  100,447 212,538 365,992 
Pooled Superannuation Trusts      101 
Total  105,448 216,456 366,668 
Source: APRA 
The number of accounts continued to expand even after the attainment of near universal 
coverage in 1995 (Table 12). This signifies a trend to multiple account holding and may 
also imply a large number of inactive accounts.  Retail funds have more than half of all 
outstanding accounts, followed by industry funds. The large presence of retail funds 
raises concerns about the operating efficiency of the second pillar because retail funds are 
notoriously more expensive than other types of funds and also suffer from a much wider 
dispersion of operating costs and fees. 
                                                 
32 The balance of statutory funds of life insurance companies is the difference between superannuation 
assets reported by life insurers and the assets that superannuation funds report as held with insurance 
companies. This mainly covers assets backing various types of annuities and capital funds.  
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End  June  1995 2000 2007 
 million 
Corporate  1.4 1.2 0.7 
Industry 4.9  7.0  10.7 
Public  sector  3.1 2.4 2.9 
Retail  6.0 11.1 15.4 
Small Funds  0.1    0.7 
Total  15.5 21.5 30.4 
Source: APRA 
6.2  Life Insurance Companies 
The Australian life insurance industry represents a significant though declining part of the 
financial services sector.  As at end June 2007 total industry assets were $257 billion.  
Superannuation business represents around 90 percent of the total life insurance office 
assets.  The life insurance industry accounts for 20 percent of superannuation assets, 
down from 41 percent a decade ago.  
There are currently 35 life insurance companies operating in Australia down from 50 ten 
years ago.  The major industry participants include the large wealth management groups 
including independent, bank-owned and foreign institutions. Major banks have acquired a 
strategic stake in the industry: they now account for over 50 percent of industry assets.  
The wealth management companies typically have a range of legal entities to provide for 
the management of wealth.  Despite the large number of players the industry is quite 
concentrated. The top three life insurance groups accounted for 63 percent of total 
industry assets and 75 percent of new business premiums in 2006.   The top ten life 
insurance groups represented 93 percent of total assets. 
The major products offered by the life insurance industry are pure risk, annuities, 
investment account and investment-linked (Table 13).  The superannuation premiums 
mainly flow into investment-linked products. Of the two broad types of life insurance 
products, regular (or annual) premium and single premium, single premium business now 
accounts for 80 percent of life insurance premiums, of which, 97 percent relates to 
superannuation business. The vast majority of premiums are directed to investment 
accounts, of which investment-linked predominate.  
Table 13:  Life Insurance Premiums ($ billion; year to 30 June) 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 percent  of  total 
Investment-linked  61.3 62.0 60.6 65.3 61.7 69.2 
Investment Account  10.1 8.7 6.3 5.9 5.3 5.1 
Annuities  16.6 15.9 19.1 12.6 16.8 13.3 
Risk  10.6 12.5 12.6 15.0 15.2 11.6 
Conventional  1.4 1.6 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.0 
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
        
Total  (AUD  billion)  36.7 32.1 35.0 34.0 37.6 41.5 
Total (% of GDP)  4.83% 3.97% 4.17% 3.79% 3.89% 4.01% 
Source:  APRA Life Office Market Reports 
  39Annuities form only a small component of life insurance business (Table 14).  Annuity 
business attracts about one-sixth of total premiums. The business has shown some 
volatility in recent years, usually in response to changes in government incentives under 
its retirement income policy.  However, as shown in Table 15, allocated annuities, mostly 
related to superannuation, dominate total annuity business. Since 2005 lifetime annuity 
business has almost completely disappeared.
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Table 14:  Annuity Business of Life Companies (year to 30 June) 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
  percent of total 
Individual         
Allocated: non-investment linked  4.4 3.2 0.8 0.8 1.2 2.2
Allocated: investment-linked  44.1 36.4 32.7 57.9 71.7 74.1
Market-linked (a)   0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 1.0 1.1
Lifetime  2.8 5.1 6.3 0.6 0.5 0.4
Term  45.9 49.6 53.4 29.8 19.8 20.8
Group         
Allocated: non-investment linked  1.4 3.4 4.9 8.6 0.9 0.8
Allocated: investment-linked  1.4 2.4 1.9 1.8 2.0 0.7
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total(AUD  billion)  6.10 5.10 6.70 4.30  6.30  6.8
Total (% GDP)  0.80% 0.63% 0.80% 0.48% 0.65% 0.66%
Source:  APRA Prudential Rules 26 and 32 collections 
Table 15:  Superannuation Assets of Life Companies (year to 30 June) 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Total  Assets  (AUD  billion)  188.4 186.5 196.9 211.4 231.7 256.6 
Total Assets (% GDP)  24.8%  23.1% 23.4% 23.6% 24.0% 24.8% 
Superannuation  Assets  (%  total)  86% 86% 87% 88% 89% 90% 
  percent of total superannuation assets 
Lifetime  Annuities  2.4 2.8 2.6 2.5 2.1 1.7 
Term  Annuities  3.3 4.3 3.6 3.9 3.2 2.8 
Allocated  Annuities  13.5 12.7 12.3 12.2 12.4 13.7 
Investment  Account  14.1 13.8 12.6 11.0  9.6  8.4 
Investment  Linked  66.7 66.4 69.0 70.4 72.7 73.4 
Total  Superannuation  Assets  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source:  APRA Life Office Market Reports 
One factor, which has a bearing on the popularity of lifetime annuities, is the value that 
they provide to their purchaser as measured by the money’s worth ratios.  Knox (2000) 
found that the majority of money’s worth ratios for Australian annuities are in the range 
of 85-95 percent of the purchase price.  He also observed that the results in Australia, 
even though the market is poorly developed, are consistent with major international 
markets and that the MWRs compare favorably with recent research for the UK and US 
markets. However, in more recent research Ganegoda (2007) reports that when compared 
with previous calculations for Australian annuities, it appears that the money’s worth of 
Australian annuities have dropped significantly reflecting high loadings, such as 
                                                 
33 Only four companies are currently providing regular quotes on life annuities compared with 11 in 1998 
(Ganegoda 2007) 
  40administrative costs and profit margins. Allocated annuities receive the same tax and 
income test treatment as life annuities. Despite the higher risks retained by their holders, 
they are perceived by many investors as having considerable advantages over life 
annuities, mainly because of their greater flexibility. 
The boost in term and lifetime business in 2004 appears related to a desire by retirees to 
seek a guaranteed income source following the poor investment performance of 
investment-linked products in the previous couple of years, and the impact of government 
policy which brought forward purchases.  In February 2004 the government announced 
that from September 2004 monies invested in term and lifetime annuities would only be 
50 percent exempt from the asset test for the age pension instead of 100 percent, making 
them considerably less attractive; this brought forward purchases of these products 
resulting in a spike in sales in 2004 and a sharp fall in subsequent years. 
7  Trends in Product Composition 
7.1  Product Mix – a story of attitudes 
Until the late 1980s Australians had a voluntary system of retirement savings.  The age 
pension was seen as the principal form of support in retirement and private savings were 
viewed as providing funds which they could use freely as they chose.  Employees who 
changed jobs were able to cash their entitlements. The average balance in private 
superannuation was relatively small. In the mid-1990s fewer than 10 percent of lump 
sums exceeded $200,000.  Those receiving a smaller lump sum were more likely to use it 
to clear debts, for home improvements and for general living expenses. Data on intended 
disbursement of lump sums appear to indicate that as a lump sum increases in average 
size, a greater proportion will be spent on financial investments. 
For the whole of the superannuation industry, lump sum payments declined in recent 
years from representing 79 percent of all benefits in 2002 to 68 percent in 2005 and 
further to 55 percent in 2007 (Table 16). Total benefit payments have fluctuated around 4 
percent of GDP. 
Table 16: Composition of Benefit Payments 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
  percent of total benefit payments 
Lump Sums  79.1 78.6 68.4 67.7 58.6 55.2 
Pensions  20.9 21.4 31.6 32.3 41.4 44.8 
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Total (AUD billion)  32.5 33.2 30.7 32.5 37.7 41.1 
Total (% of GDP)  4.3 4.1 3.7 3.6 3.9 4.0 
Source: APRA 
This pattern conceals large differences across types of funds, even though all 
superannuation funds report a decline in the relative importance of lump sum payments 
(Table 17). Public sector funds, reflecting the historical importance of defined benefit and 
pension paying funds, show a high proportion of pension payments. These grew from 42 
percent of all benefits in 2002 to 69 percent in 2007. In corporate funds pension payments 
  41rose from 15 percent in 2002 to 33 percent in 2006 but fell to 23 percent in 2007.
34 For 
retail funds, pension payments have grown from 8 percent of total payments in 1997 and 
15 percent in 2002 to 30 percent in 2007.  In 1997 virtually no pensions were paid by 
industry funds, but pension payments have grown, particularly in the last 3 years, to 
represent over 12 percent of total benefit payments. Other funds, which comprise small 
funds with less than 5 members, show an erratic pattern, which may be due to gaps in the 
statistical data  
Table 17: Proportion of Pension Payments 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
  percent of total benefits 
Public Pension Funds  41.5 46.6 51.2 66.0 64.8 68.6 
Retail Funds  15.0 14.0 18.1 21.0 24.8 29.6 
Corporate Funds  14.7 18.2 26.7 30.0 33.3 23.1 
Industry Funds  5.6  4.8 10.0 11.5 11.1 11.9 
Other   3.7  50.0 5.1 5.1  51.2  61.8 
Source: APRA 
It should be remembered that prior to the legislative changes in 1998, government and 
large corporate funds were generally the only type of funds offering superannuation 
pensions and that members of other types of funds were compelled to take lump sums.  
However, the legislative changes in 1998
35 made it more attractive for a wider range of 
superannuation funds to offer pensions and pension payments as a percentage of total 
benefits have been increasing since that time, although most would be allocated pensions 
rather than lifetime pensions.
36 The decline in the proportion of benefits taken as a lump 
sum has been associated to some extent with the rapid growth in superannuation balances 
as a result of the increase of regular mandatory contributions.  As these balances have 
grown there appears to be a greater desire by people to take them as income streams to 
support them in retirement. 
Until the introduction of compulsory superannuation and the growing realization that in 
order to live comfortably in retirement additional savings will be necessary there was a 
strong incentive for people to manage their financial affairs with a view to maximizing 
their access to the age pension.  Retirees could also “double dip” by taking their lump 
sum, spending it as they wished and then apply to receive the age pension.  The system 
provided encouragement for early retirement for those with accumulated superannuation 
which they would use to live on until they became eligible for the age pension. This was 
a function of the wide difference between the age at which a person could take early 
retirement (55) and the age at which they could get access to the age pension (65) and the 
fact that the early retirees needed funds on which to live until they reached the 
pensionable age, making double-dipping a natural outcome of early retirement.  
                                                 
34 There was an increase in the value of pension payments but a large jump in lump sum payments, perhaps 
related to industry restructuring. 
35 In 1998, the Government extended the income streams qualifying as complying pensions and annuities to 
include non-commutable income streams that pay a guaranteed income for a person's life expectancy. 
36 The definition of pension benefits includes the total value of benefits paid to fund members in the form 
of a pension.  It includes complying pensions, allocated pensions and annuity payments. 
  42Despite these incentives, there is no compelling evidence of deliberate rapid run down of 
balances during that period.  Some survey evidence
37 show that there was little 
dissipation of lump sums on such things as overseas trips and other forms of 
consumption: just over 85 percent of the lump sum value was directed toward 
investments in securities, property or businesses.  
Over the last 20 years Australia has put in place a retirement system with a much greater 
focus on self provision (either in full or in part) for a growing number of the population 
through the superannuation guarantee.  The system is still designed to be a mix of the age 
pension, superannuation and voluntary savings but people have been encouraged to 
provide for their own retirement so that they can enjoy a standard of living much higher 
than they would get on the basic age pension.  Entreaties by both the government and the 
retirement industry seem to have caused a significant shift in attitudes over time.  For 
younger workers today there no longer appears to be an expectation that the government 
will support them in retirement, and for most, compulsory superannuation is considered 
both necessary and desirable
38.    
People today have a clear understanding that superannuation and private savings will be 
needed if they are to have a comfortable retirement.  These changes are evident in Figure 
10 which shows expectation about sources of retirement incomes, and contrasts views of 
the previous generation (i.e. current retirees) against those who are yet to reach 
retirement.  
Figure 10:  Sources of Income in Retirement 
 
 
Source:  “”Retirement Savings: Drivers and Desires”, IFSA 2001 
 
                                                 
37  Kalisch 1992 
38 “Superannuation:Survey of Key Voter Attitudes” Survey prepared by Wirthlin Worldwide Australasia 
for the Australian Association of Superannuation Funds.  
  43Over the past decade superannuation balances have grown in size due to the maturing of 
the SG system and this trend will continue for the next three decades (refer Figure 9).  
Cohort studies indicate that age pensioners are, on average, drawing down their wealth in 
retirement (Figure 11).  However, this drawdown is apparently at a very slow pace.  If 
this pattern persists this would allow these pensioners to maintain significant assets 
through many years of retirement.  This may indicate that part-rate age pensioners are 
managing their money effectively and are drawing on their assets in a way that has regard 
to their expectations of a long life. 
Figure 11:  Projected Superannuation Balances by Age, 2000-2030 
 
Source:  National Centre for Social and Economic Modeling (NATSEM) Projections in Kelly, 2003 
In addition to the findings on the rate of drawdown, there is also a substantial portion of 
this group who has increased real wealth – again suggesting careful management of 
money in retirement (Figure 12). RIMs methodology in projecting investment income of 
retirees assumes an aggregate leakage of 25 percent from superannuation lump sums. 
Figure 12:  Average Household Wealth and Indebtedness 
 
Source:  FaCSIA, Household Income and Labour Dynamics Australia (HILDA) Survey 
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people still have a strong bequest motive and are very averse to products with little or no 
residual value and no possibility of withdrawal of capital. Allocated pensions accord with 
retirees stated preference for products which offer taxation advantages, the possibility of 
a residual sum, a control of the portfolio supporting the pension and flexibility regarding 
the timing and size of a pension.  Over the past decade sales of allocate pension products 
have grown dramatically whereas the market for annuities has stagnated as shown in 
Table 18. The data indicates that in the last two years sales of lifetime annuities have 
almost completely dried up. 
Table 18:  Sales of Annuities and Allocated Pensions 
 Annuities  Allocate  Pensions  Total 













2006 519  1,008  29  1,557  13,570  527 15,654 
2005 547  877  27  1,451  10,352  457 12,260 
2004 2,757  1,073  279  4,106  7,888  47  12,041 
2003 1,357  1,352  200  2,909  5,935  -  8,844 
2002 1,100  1,897  155  3,152  6,595  -  9,747 
2001  794 1,631  167 2,592  7,613  -  10,205 
2000  672 2,324  183 3,179  6,607  -  9,786 
1999  666 1,835  246 2,747  5,717  -  8,464 
1998  603 1,766  194 2,663  4,153  -  6,816 
1997  563 1,625  201 2,386  3,522  -  5,908 
1996  646 1,224  190 2,060  1,838  -  3,898 
1995  390 1,171  184 1,745  881  -  2,626 
Source:  Plan for Life (Victoria) Pty Ltd 
Only $29 million in lifetime annuities were sold in 2006 of which $9 million was from 
superannuation moneys and $20 million was from private savings. With few providers, 
declining sales, declining competitiveness (as measured by the MWR) and the removal of 
the of the asset test exemption for long-term annuities, sales are likely to fall further and 
may even result in the extinction of lifetime annuities from the Australian market.  
7.2  Equity Release Products 
Almost one-quarter of Australians have indicated that they will rely on home ownership 
to support them in their retirement
39.  However, far fewer have indicated an intention to 
sell their home as part of their financial plans for retirement. 
Equity release products allow a person to access the equity which they have in their home 
without having to sell and move from the home.  They provide the opportunity for people 
to add to their retirement funds.  The most common equity release product is a reverse 
mortgage.  In a reverse mortgage, the consumer’s house is used as security for a loan, 
which is provided to the consumer in the form of a lump sum, a regular stream of 
payments or both. The consumer retains title to the property but grants the provider a 
mortgage to secure repayment of principal and interest under the loan. The outstanding 
balance of the loan grows over time, as the interest is capitalized (rather than repaid). The 
                                                 
39 Cameron (2001) 
  45loan and interest on it are paid back when the home is sold, when the borrower 
permanently moves away (for example, move into long-term care), or upon death.  In 
Australia the products are generally available to consumers aged 55 and over who own 
their own homes or only have a small mortgage outstanding. The amount available to be 
borrowed is usually restricted to between 20 percent and 40 percent of the total property 
value. 
The market for equity release products in Australia is developing rapidly.  According to a 
recent study
40 reverse mortgages grew from $459 million at the end of 2004 to $1.5 
billion at 31 December 2006.  The average age of borrowers is 74, although younger 
borrowers are the fastest growing group.  Although lump sums continue to dominate, 
accounting for over 80 percent of all outstanding loans, regular draw-downs are 
increasing and represented 20 percent of new loans in 2006 indicating that more people 
are using the product to supplement their pensions (SEQUAL 2007).  This growth of 
reverse mortgages has the potential to further impact attitudes towards annuities by 
giving many Australians access to additional income streams without purchasing an 
annuity product. 
Reverse mortgages have not been without their problems in the United States and the 
United Kingdom where there have been cases of mis-selling and evictions.  In Australia 
the product is subject to a range of existing consumer regulations. In addition, some 
reverse mortgage providers have established an industry association, Senior Australians 
Equity Release Association of Providers (SEQUAL) which has a Code of Conduct and 
compels its members to belong to an approved External Dispute Resolution (EDR) 
scheme. 
Reverse mortgages may have significant taxation implications, and can affect a 
consumer’s entitlement to the public pension and associated benefits and concessions. It 
can also affect the amount of daily care fees that will be levied if the retiree has to enter 
an aged-care facility.  
8  Concluding Remarks 
Observers have often puzzled over why the annuities market, especially the market for 
lifetime annuities, is not more developed in Australia.  Australians are living longer and 
face uncertainty regarding the level of their retirement income.  The two mains reasons 
for the lack of lifetime annuities appear to be that people can rely on the age pension if 
they have to, and a great desire to have flexibility in investment options which is not 
available if they purchase a lifetime annuity.  In the past 20 years there has been a 
dramatic change in the attitudes of Australians towards saving for retirement.  Most now 
feel that if they are to have a comfortable standard of living in retirement they will need 
to supplement the government provided age pension.   
Australians are building up substantial balances in the private pension system, mainly as 
a result of the compulsory SG requirements, but increasingly for many through additional 
private savings.  These continue to be taken as lump sums but there is evidence to suggest 
that the funds are being invested prudently in a range of retirement income products  The 
greatest motivation is the ensure that the funds will last people through retirement, and 
                                                 
40 Senior Australian Equity Release Association Lenders/Trowbridge Deloitte, “Reverse Mortgage Study”, 
April 2007. 
  46that there will be something left when the person dies to leave to their beneficiaries.  The 
funds are not being exhausted rapidly and there does not appear to be a fear that people 
will be left without as they grow older. 
The build up of retirement savings will act to some extent as a cushion to the impact of an 
ageing population.  Forecasts in the governments’ intergenerational report indicate that 
there will be fiscal pressures building from about 2020 onwards, not only due to age 
pensions, but also due to higher spending on healthcare.  The sense is that there is no 
‘ageing crisis’, although some changes will have to be made in the level of benefits, 
taxation or private contributions to superannuation in the longer run.  The government 
seems more than comfortable to leave the investment of retirement income savings to 
individuals.  Most people seem to be investing their funds wisely and the rundown of 
accumulated assets is only occurring slowly.  Although some concerns have been 
expressed that the current system may lead people to undertake excessive consumption in 
their early years of retirement and have to rely on the age pension in later life.  With 
changing attitudes towards the need to secure their retirement the opposite may in fact be 
true.  It may be the case that people are too conservative in their spending and spend too 
little rather than too much.  This reduces individual welfare, but it does reduce recourse 
to the age pension. 
There do not appear to be any significant concerns about longevity risk among 
Australians and hence there is very little demand for products, such as lifetime annuities, 
which provide a hedge against this risk.  Many expect that they will have sufficient 
resources to ensure that they have a comfortable retirement, while those that do not can 
rely on the age pension.  Finally, for many Australians their home provides an additional 
buffer, particularly given a growing understanding of equity release products. 
Over a number of years the Australian government has taken a number of initiatives 
aimed at reducing incentives for early retirement.  These include the standardization of 
the retirement age for men and women by phasing in a higher age for women; the 
increase in compulsory preservation age for occupational superannuation from 55 to 60; 
the introduction of higher RBL limits for retirement benefits taken at least half in annuity 
form; and the introduction of a deferred pension bonus plan.  The Government appears 
satisfied that it has its parametric settings broadly correct. 
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